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Doing, seeing, or both: Effects of learning condition on
subsequent action perception
Alison J. Wiggett1, Matthew Hudson2, Angela Clifford3, Steven P. Tipper1,
and Paul E. Downing1
1School of Psychology, Bangor University, Wales, UK
2Universidad del Norte, Barranquilla, Colombia
3School of Sport, Exercise and Health Sciences, Loughborough University, Loughborough, UK
It has been proposed that common codes for vision and action emerge from associations between an individual’s
production and simultaneous observation of actions. This typically first-person view of one’s own action subse-
quently transfers to the third-person view when observing another individual. We tested vision–action associations
and the transfer from first-person to third-person perspective by comparing novel hand-action sequences that were
learned under three conditions: first, by being performed and simultaneously viewed from a first-person perspec-
tive; second, by being performed but not seen; and third, by being seen from a first-person view without being
executed. We then used functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) to compare the response to these three
types of learned action sequences when they were presented from a third-person perspective. Visuomotor areas
responded most strongly to sequences that were learned by simultaneously producing and observing the action
sequences. We also note an important asymmetry between vision and action: Action sequences learned by perfor-
mance alone, in the absence of vision, facilitated the emergence of visuomotor responses, whereas action sequences
learned by viewing alone had comparably little effect. This dominance of action over vision supports the notion of
forward/predictive models of visuomotor systems.
Keywords: Mirror systems; Action observation; Learning.
The learning of new actions and skills takes place
throughout the entire life span: from babies learning
to reach for and grasp objects, to children learning
to write or play an instrument, to adults learning to
drive a car. Moreover, as actions often take place in
a social context, we must also be able to understand
what other people are doing and whether their actions
are the same as or different from our own actions: for
example, when trying to learn a new dance sequence
by watching somebody else perform it. This ability
requires a system that is able to abstract across differ-
ent viewpoints of actions—from first-person views of
our own actions to third-person views of other people.
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This study investigated the necessary conditions for
building action representations that abstract across
views in this way, and the brain regions that support
these representations.
Behavioral and neuroimaging studies have sug-
gested a strong link between the observation of others’
and the execution of our own actions. For example,
observing another person perform an action facili-
tates our execution of that action (Bach, Peatfield, &
Tipper, 2007; Bach & Tipper, 2007; Brass, Bekkering,
Wohlschläger, & Prinz, 2000). This priming effect is
thought to reflect the activation of specific action rep-
resentations by observation—the same representations































2 WIGGETT ET AL.
that are activated when a person actually performs the
action. This idea is supported by studies using tran-
scranial magnetic stimulation (TMS) that have shown
specific facilitation of relevant motor pathways dur-
ing action observation (Fadiga, Fogassi, Pavesi, &
Rizzolatti, 1995; Romani, Cesari, Urgesi, Facchini, &
Aglioti, 2005; Strafella & Paus, 2000). Furthermore,
functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) stud-
ies have found that areas of the parietal and premo-
tor cortices are activated by both the perception and
the execution of actions (e.g., Buccino, Vogt, et al.,
2004; Dinstein, Hasson, Rubin, & Heeger, 2007; Etzel,
Gazzola, & Keysers, 2008). Although these areas are
commonly thought to be the homologue of “mir-
ror neurons” found in macaques (neurons that fire
both when the animal executes a specific action and
when it perceives the experimenter performing the
same action [Di Pellegrino, Fadiga, Fogassi, Gallese,
& Rizzolatti, 1992]), there is still debate about the
neuroimaging evidence for a common code of vision
and action in the human brain (Dinstein, Gardner,
Jazayeri, & Heeger, 2008; Hickock, 2009; Kilner,
Neal, Weiskopf, Friston, & Frith, 2009; Lingnau,
Gesierich, & Caramazza, 2009; Mukamel, Ekstrom,
Kaplan, Iacoboni, & Fried, 2010; Oosterhof, Wiggett,
Diedrichsen, Tipper, & Downing, 2010). Below, we
review some of the behavioral and neuroscientific lit-
erature demonstrating strong links between the obser-
vation and the execution of actions, with a particular
focus on the role of learning and experience.
The ability to perform a specialized set of
motor skills results in increased perceptual accu-
racy when observing and discriminating the corre-
sponding actions. Aglioti, Cesari, Romani, and Urgesi
(2008), for example, compared elite basketball play-
ers to basketball coaches and sports journalists, and
found that the basketball players were faster and more
accurate at predicting whether a shot was going to
be on target. (Using TMS, the authors also found
increased motor excitability in the hand of the bas-
ketball players when observing shots that resulted
in misses.) Calvo-Merino, Ehrenberg, Leung, and
Haggard (2010) looked at the visual discrimination
of biological motion using point-light ballet moves.
The authors found that expert ballet dancers were sig-
nificantly better at discriminating between different
exemplars of the same movement compared to nonex-
perts. Similar effects have also been shown for newly
learned actions. Casile and Giese (2006) investigated
the visual recognition of gait patterns before and after
nonvisual motor training. Participants learned a novel
coordinated upper-body movement pattern that con-
sisted of swinging the arms 270◦ out of phase with
the legs (as opposed to the usual 180◦ seen in natural
walking). After training, the participants completed a
same/different matching task with point-light walkers
presented at different phase shifts. The authors found
selective improvement of the visual recognition per-
formance for learned movements. Finally, a study by
Serino et al. (2010) found comparable effects in hemi-
plegics. The patients viewed and named arm gestures
presented as point-light displays. Action recognition
was significantly better for actions performed by their
unaffected arm compared to actions that appeared to
have been performed by their hemiplegic arm. These
results support the idea of a significant motor contri-
bution to visual action processing.
Further evidence for the action perception link in
the context of expertise and familiarity has come from
recent neuroimaging studies. These have shown that
neural activity in visuomotor areas tends to be stronger
for familiar compared to unfamiliar actions. Calvo-
Merino, Glaser, Grèzes, Passingham, and Haggard
(2005), for example, scanned ballet and capoeira
dancers and nondancers while they watched videos
of ballet and capoeira dance moves. The authors
found greater activation in premotor, inferior pari-
etal lobe (IPL), right superior parietal lobe, and left
superior temporal sulcus (SPS) for movements that
were in the observer’s motor repertoire. In a fur-
ther study, Calvo-Merino, Grèzes, Glaser, Passingham,
and Haggard (2006) compared male and female ballet
dancers. As ballet moves are only performed by one
gender, the authors were able to test specifically for
motor familiarity while controlling for visual familiar-
ity. The authors found greater premotor, parietal, and
cerebellar activities when viewing moves from own
motor repertoire. A study by Cross, Hamilton, and
Grafton (2006) tested expert dancers as they learned
new dance moves over a 5-week period. While in
the scanner, participants watched videos of the dance
moves and were instructed to imagine dancing the pre-
sented movements. The results showed that the IPL
and the ventral premotor areas were modulated as a
function of the dancers’ rating of ability and motor
experience. Further studies by Cross and colleagues
(Cross, Hamilton, Kraemer, Kelley, & Grafton, 2009;
Cross, Kraemer, Hamilton, Kelley, & Grafton, 2009)
have shown similar effects in nonexpert dancers for
newly learned dance moves. Taken together, these
studies point to a significant role of “motor resonance”
in perceptual effects of expertise.
A key question is how the associations between
sensory inputs and motor outputs are learned in the
first place. In Keysers and Perrett’s (2004) Hebbian
model, it is the repeated experience of watching
oneself perform an action that plays a critical role
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simultaneously observing an action causes associ-
ations to be made between the motor output and
the visual input, such that simply viewing an action
becomes sufficient to activate motor representations of
that action. Furthermore, the system learns to gener-
alize across viewpoints (e.g., when viewing someone
else perform an action) such that actions come to
be represented visually in both first-person and third-
person coordinates. The associative sequence learn-
ing (ASL) model by Heyes and colleagues (Heyes,
2001, 2005; Heyes, Bird, Johnson, & Haggard, 2005;
Heyes & Ray, 2000) likewise emphasizes the impor-
tance of correlated sensorimotor experience. However,
a crucial difference between the ASL model and the
Hebbian model is that the latter assumes that contigu-
ity is sufficient for the associations between vision and
action to be learned (i.e., the execution and observation
of an action occurring together in time), whereas the
ASL model emphasizes the importance of contingency
(i.e., a predictive relationship between the two events)
for the development of a “mirror” system (Cook,
Press, Dickinson, & Heyes, 2010). Furthermore, the
correlated experience of observing and executing the
same actions can arise not just from self-observation,
but also from mirror exposure or from performing
synchronous actions with other people (e.g., being imi-
tated by adults). These different forms of correlated
sensorimotor experience are also likely to be critical
for learning to recognize actions performed by other
people, and to match those actions to our own.
The aim of this study was to test whether the per-
ception of others’ actions elicits differential cortical
activity as a function of the visual and/or motor con-
ditions under which those actions were learned. If, as
outlined above, correlated sensorimotor experience is
crucial for learning a rich representation of actions that
can be generalized to perceiving others, then learn-
ing to perform an action while simultaneously seeing
oneself perform it should lead to significant “mirror
system” activation (vision + action condition). This
can be compared to learning conditions in which motor
output and visual input are not correlated, such as
where actions are learned “blind,” without visual feed-
back (action condition), or where actions performed by
someone else are passively viewed (vision condition).
In this study, we tested this hypothesis by training
participants to learn novel sequences of hand move-
ments under these three conditions. The sequences
consisted of three hand postures (see Method for
details). While the individual hand postures were prob-
ably not novel to the participants (i.e., it is likely
that the participants had previously experienced the
individual motor states of the postures), the specific
sequence of these motor states was novel and it is
these action sequences that are the unit of assessment
in this study. Participants were subsequently scanned
while passively viewing movies of another person per-
forming the learned action sequences, as well as novel
action sequences for which the participants had neither
visual nor motor experience. We predicted differential
activations in visuomotor areas, in the form of greater
response to the action sequences that were learned in
the “vision + action” condition compared to the single
modality conditions of vision or action. This would
support the sensorimotor learning hypothesis.
An important aspect of this study is that during
learning, the visual input from the action sequences
(where present) was perceived in the normal first-
person perspective. That is, the hand movements were
shown at the viewing angle and orientation from which
we normally perceive our own movements. At test,
however, the action sequences were shown in the oppo-
site orientation—the normal view from which we see
others’ actions. This is important to test the predictions
outlined earlier: Correlated motor and visual input can
produce action learning that generalizes to the percep-
tion of other individuals. Previous fMRI studies have
either not controlled for how the actions were learned
as the actions were in the participants’ repertoire
before the experiment (e.g., Calvo-Merino et al., 2005,
2006) or presented “third-person” views of the to-be-
learned actions (i.e., movies of another person per-
forming the action) in both the training and test phases
(Cross, Hamilton, et al., 2009; Cross, Kraemer, et al.,
2009). Furthermore, previous studies emphasizing the
importance of correlated sensorimotor experience for
mirror learning (e.g., Catmur et al., 2008; Catmur,
Walsh, & Heyes, 2007) have not directly tested for
this transfer from first-person learning to third-person
observation. Thus, the current fMRI study is novel in
two important ways: (i) It includes multiple types of
learning (action only, vision only, and vision + action)
as well as a novel (untrained) condition and (ii) it
tests whether the learning of action sequences transfers
from a first-person to a third-person perspective.
METHOD
Participants
Twelve participants (mean age = 24.5 years; range =
20–32 years; 7 women, 5 men) were all students at
Bangor University and took part in exchange for £25.
All participants gave written informed consent prior to
taking part, and the study procedures were approved































4 WIGGETT ET AL.
Stimuli and apparatus
The stimuli used were 12 novel action sequences, each
consisting of three hand postures. (Note that several of
the hand postures were taken from the American Sign
Language alphabet. However, all participants tested
were from the United Kingdom and were unfamiliar
with the hand postures.) Each individual hand posture
(performed by one of the experimenters) was pho-
tographed and printed (example shown in Figure 1);
these were used in the instruction phase described
below.
Each action sequence was also performed by one of
the experimenters and filmed from two different per-
spectives: a first-person and a third-person perspective
(Figure 2). This provided 24 movies in total (12 action
sequences × 2 perspectives) each of 4 s duration. The
first-person movies were used in the training session;
the third-person movies were converted to gray scale
and used as visual stimuli during the fMRI scan (see
below). To minimize the visual differences between
the participants’ and the experimenter’s hands, the
experimenter performing the actions wore a yellow
glove, which was also worn by the participants during
the training sessions.
Training
A computer monitor was positioned at the edge of
a desk and the participant was seated closely in front
of the monitor with his or her hand positioned behind
the monitor (Figure 3). The input to the monitor could
be switched between one of two sources. The input
came either from a camera (MRC Systems GmbH,
Heidelberg, Germany) placed immediately behind the
monitor, facing away from the participant and pointing
downward toward the participant’s hand at an angle of
approximately 45◦. When participants positioned their
hand behind the monitor, they were able to view their
hand from a first-person perspective, that is, as if the
monitor was not there and they were looking directly
at their hand through a frame. Alternatively, the mon-
itor input came from a computer (iMac G4, Apple,
Cupertino, CA) that was operated by the experimenter
and was used to display the prerecorded stimuli of the
experimenter performing the action sequences.
Design and procedure
The 12 action sequences were randomly split into
four groups of three sequences. Each set of action
sequences was assigned to one of four training con-
ditions. This allocation was counterbalanced across
participants such that for 3 out of the 12 participants
the same three action sequences were assigned to the
same condition.
Training
Prior to scanning, participants completed two train-
ing sessions in which they learned 9 of the 12 action
sequences. Each session lasted approximately 40 min.
The two training sessions took place 1 day apart, with
the scanning session taking place immediately after
the second training session. During training, partici-
pants wore a yellow rubber glove on their right hand.
This was done in order to minimize low-level visual
differences between conditions (see below).
The visual input and/or motor output experienced
during the training phase varied across three exper-
imental training conditions. For three of the action
sequences, participants executed the sequence while
being able to view their movements in real time on
the computer monitor in front of them (with input
provided by the camera). The encoding and learn-
ing of these action sequences therefore involved both
visual stimulation and motor activation (vision +
action condition). A further three action sequences
were learned by performing the sequence without
receiving any visual feedback. Thus, the participants’
1 2 3
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(a)
(b)
Figure 2. An example of one of the actions presented shown from a first-person perspective (a) and a third-person perspective (b). Movies like
the one shown in (a) were presented in the vision-only condition of the training phase; movies shown in (b) were shown during scanning. The
example shows a subset of frames (18 out of 120) from the full movie.
movements were not presented on the screen. Instead,
a yellow fixation cross was presented on a black
background. The encoding and learning of these action
sequences was therefore from motor output only, and
the visual stimulation was not related to the action
sequence being performed (action condition). The
next three action sequences were learned by obser-
vation only. Participants were required to keep their
hand motionless palm down on the table behind the
monitor and simply watch the movies presented on
screen. These were the prerecorded video clips of the
action sequences from a first-person perspective per-
formed by the experimenter. Videos were presented
using iMovie. Encoding and learning of these action
sequences was therefore from visual input only (vision
condition). The remaining three action sequences
were not presented to the participants during the
training session and were only used in the scanning
session. These action sequences were therefore com-
pletely novel to the participant during the scan (novel
condition).
The order of training conditions (vision + action,
action, and vision) was counterbalanced within and
across participants. Each of the conditions was
encountered one after the other (e.g., vision followed
by action followed by vision + action). This was
repeated 3 times with a different action sequence in
each repetition, such that each of the nine action
sequences was encountered once. This block of nine
action sequences was repeated 6 times over the two
training sessions (three in each). In each block, the
order in which the conditions were encountered was
counterbalanced, such that each of the six possible






























6 WIGGETT ET AL.
Figure 3. Experimental setup. During the training session, partic-
ipants sat close to the desk and placed their right hand behind the
monitor (a). They were able to view their hand from a first-person
position on screen from input provided by a camera in position (b).
Camera position (c) was not used during training; it was used only
to record the movies of the hand actions (performed by an experi-
menter) filmed from a third-person perspective that were used in the
scanner.
repetitions (e.g., 3 × [V + A, V, A], 3 × [V +
A, A, V], 3 × [V, A, V + A], 3 × [V, V + A,
A], 3 × [A, V + A, V], 3 × [A, V, V + A]).
Furthermore, the order in which these six combina-
tions of the training conditions were presented was
counterbalanced across participants. Overall, each of
the 9 action sequences was encountered 6 times, result-
ing in 54 trials (27 in each session). These counterbal-
ancing measures resulted in the action sequences being
presented in a pseudorandom order.
At the start of each trial, the participant was shown
pictures of the three hand postures that constituted
the to-be-learned action sequence (example shown in
Figure 1). The participant was asked to memorize
the action sequence only by looking at the pictures.
He or she was not permitted to rehearse the action
sequence, and the experimenter did not demonstrate
the action sequence to the participant. This was to
ensure that the role of visual input and motor output
during the encoding of the actions was carefully con-
trolled as per the designated experimental conditions.
No time restrictions were placed on the memoriza-
tion part. Once the participant felt he had memorized
the action sequence, the trial began. In the action and
vision + action conditions, participants performed the
action sequence 8 times. The pace at which it was exe-
cuted was slow and rhythmic, with approximately 1 s
between each of the separate postures. A rest posture
(flat hand) separated each performance of the action
sequence. If the participant forgot the action sequence
or was not performing it to the desired level of accu-
racy, he or she was asked to look at the pictures again.
However, as before, neither the participant nor the
experimenter performed the action sequence while the
participant was looking at the pictures. When the par-
ticipant began the action sequence again, the count
continued from before.
For the vision + action and action conditions,
participants were told that no feedback from the exper-
imenter was indicative of accurate performance of the
action sequence. Only when the participant forgot the
action or was not performing it to the desired level
of accuracy was feedback given. Thus, feedback took
the form of correcting errors rather than reinforcing
accurate execution of the action sequence. As much
feedback as necessary was given to ensure that the
action sequence was executed correctly 8 times dur-
ing a single block. Therefore, although we did not
record the amount of feedback given or the number
of times the participant needed to look at the action
pictures again, we were confident that the number
of correct performances was the same for all action
sequences across both the vision + action and the
action condition.
The video clips in the vision condition depicted
the action sequence being performed at the same pace
with a black screen of 1 s duration separating each
individual performance of the action sequence (eight
repetitions). Each action sequence was therefore either
seen or performed 48 times in total.
fMRI scan
Participants were scanned immediately after the
second training session. Three runs investigated the
central hypothesis that the perception of others’
actions elicits differential cortical activity in premo-
tor and parietal areas as a function of the visual/motor
conditions under which those actions were learned.
Participants passively viewed the movies of all the
12 prerecorded action sequences, filmed from a third-
person perspective (as shown in Figure 2b). Passive
viewing was selected to avoid requiring participants to
select and make motor responses that could contami-
nate the activation of the regions of interest.
Each of the three runs contained 16 blocks (see
Figure 4a), consisting of 4 blocks per condition (vision
+ action, action, vision, novel). Within each block,
four movies (each 4 s, 30 frames/second) were pre-
sented: for example, four movies of action sequences



























































































































































































Figure 4. Illustration of the blocked design paradigm (a) and the design and summary of analyses (b).
four from the action condition, followed by four from
the vision condition, followed by four movies from the
novel condition (one of the three actions per condition
was presented twice in each block). There were four
designs of the experimental runs in which the presen-
tation order of the action sequences from the different
training conditions were counterbalanced across each
of the blocks. Furthermore, the presentation of each
block was counterbalanced across the designs. This
ensured that the order in which the training conditions
were presented was counterbalanced across the blocks
within a run, across the runs within a participant, and
across participants. Each major block was separated by
a 16 s baseline fixation period that was also presented
at the start and end of the run. In total, each run lasted
5.6 min (4 s × 4 movies × 4 conditions × 4 blocks +
5 fixation baseline periods).
Data acquisition. The data were acquired using a
3T Philips MRI scanner with a SENSE phased-array
head coil. For functional imaging, a single-shot echo
planar imaging sequence was used (T2∗-weighted,
gradient echo sequence; echo time, 35 ms; flip angle,
90◦). The scanning parameters were as follows: repe-
tition time 2000 ms; 31 off-axial slices; voxel dimen-
sions 3 mm × 3 mm × 3 mm, field of view (FOV)
240 ×240, matrix 80 × 80, phase encoding direction
A-P. Seven dummy scans were acquired before each
functional scan to reduce possible effects of T1 satu-
ration. Parameters for T1-weighted anatomical scans
were 288 × 232 matrix; 1 mm isotropic voxels; TR =
8.4 ms, TE = 3.8 ms; flip angle = 8◦.
Data analysis. Preprocessing and statistical anal-
yses of the MRI data were performed using
BrainVoyager QX 1.9 (Brain Innovation, Maastricht,
The Netherlands). Functional data were motion cor-
rected, and low-frequency drifts were removed with
a temporal high-pass filter (0.006 Hz). The data from
the main experiment were spatially smoothed using
a 6 mm full-width-half-maximum kernel. Functional
data were manually co-registered with the anatomical
T1 scans. The three-dimensional anatomical scans






























8 WIGGETT ET AL.
Tournoux, 1988), and the parameters from this trans-
formation were subsequently applied to the co-
registered functional data.
For each participant, general linear models (GLMs)
were created. One boxcar predictor, convolved with
a two-gamma hemodynamic response function (HRF)
function to model the hemodynamic response, mod-
eled each condition of interest. Regressors of no inter-
est were also included to account for differences in the
mean MR signal across scans. Regressors were fitted
to the MR time series in each voxel, and the result-
ing beta parameter estimates were used to estimate the
magnitude of response to each of the conditions in the
main experiment.
RESULTS
Did learning in the “vision + action”
condition lead to the most widespread
activation in visuomotor areas?
The central question of this study was to test whether
having motor and visual input during the learning
of new action sequences compared to action-only or
visual-only learning subsequently led to greater brain
activity when viewing someone else perform the same
actions. The prefrontal and parietal regions of the
brain were of particular interest in this and subsequent
analyses.
A whole-brain random-effects analysis for the
contrast vision + action > [action, vision, novel]
(+3,–1,–1,–1) was carried out (Analysis 1a in
Figure 4). This revealed activation in the frontal and
parietal areas mainly in the left hemisphere (see
Figure 5), including the inferior frontal gyrus (IFG),
the postcentral gyrus, and the superior temporal sul-
cus. Activations significant at a cluster size threshold
of p < .05 (corresponding to 5 voxels; uncorrected
threshold p < .005) are further listed in Table 1.
Overall, these analyses reveal more widespread activa-
tion when the participants had previous simultaneous
visual and motor experience of the action sequences
they were passively viewing in the scanner.
To rule out the possibility that this result was
due to the novel condition not activating these areas
at all, rather than the vision + action condition
activating them more than the other learning con-
ditions, we repeated the analysis leaving out the
novel condition. The contrast vision + action >
[action, vision] (+2,–1,–1,0) resulted in many of the
same activations as (+3,–1,–1,–1), with the excep-
tion of the activation in the left precuneus and the
right cingulate (see Table 1; cluster size threshold
of p < .05; corresponding to 5 voxels; uncorrected
threshold p < .005). Additionally, the new analysis
resulted in two activations in the superior temporal sul-
cus (one in each hemisphere) and a further activation
in the left precentral gyrus. Importantly, all activations
in the core regions of interest (prefrontal and pari-
etal visuomotor regions) were significant whether the
novel condition was included in the analysis or not.
To further test whether action + vision led to
greater activation than either action alone or vision
Figure 5. Activations from the whole-brain random-effects group-average analysis of vision + action > (action, vision, novel) overlaid on
the average anatomical scan from all participants. Activations significant at a cluster size threshold of p < .05 (corresponding to 5 voxels) are
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TABLE 1




(mm3) X Y Z Max (t)
Vision + action vs. (action, vision, novel)
L postcentral gyrus1 1379 –45 –25 43 5.75
L superior frontal gyrus1 682 –3 65 26 6.24
L superior frontal gyrus1 534 –6 48 40 6.54
L inferior frontal gyrus1 407 –48 –1 10 5.05
L insula1 401 –36 –10 16 6.24
L posterior superior temporal sulcus1 343 –42 –54 20 5.03
L anterior superior temporal sulcus1 260 –51 –16 –4 5.37
L orbital gyrus1 200 –15 20 –7 5.68
L precuneus 180 –15 –48 31 4.31
L middle temporal gyrus1 175 –48 0 –20 5.33
R superior frontal gyrus1 559 15 36 –5 5.59
R postcentral gyrus1 307 54 –16 29 5.56
R cingulate gyrus 165 12 11 34 5.31
Note: 1Activations also significant for vision + action > [action, vision] (+2,–1,–1,0).
alone, we performed two additional simple contrasts
(Analysis 1b in Figure 4). The contrast vision +
action > action resulted in a number of activations
mostly in the superior frontal gyrus and the IFG in
the left hemisphere. The vision + action > vision
alone resulted in widespread activation, again mainly
in the left hemisphere. This included activations in
ventral premotor cortex, motor cortex, precentral sul-
cus, inferior parietal sulcus, superior temporal sulcus,
and inferior temporal sulcus. Activations significant at
a cluster size threshold of p < .05 (corresponding to
5 voxels, uncorrected threshold p < .005) are listed in
Table 2.
Is there a difference between
(unimodal) action and vision?
The above analyses suggest that the pattern of activa-
tion found for action only is more similar to action +
vision than that found for vision only. This would
suggest that it is specifically motor input during learn-
ing that is crucial for the subsequent activation of
visuomotor areas during the viewing of third-person
actions. However, so far we have not examined the
effects of either type of learning by itself. Following on
from the previous analyses, we predict that learning in
the action-only condition will lead to more activation
in visuomotor areas than learning in the vision-only
condition. To test this, a whole-brain random-effects
analysis for the contrast action > vision was carried
out (Analysis 2 in Figure 4). Although this revealed
less widespread activation than the previous analyses,
learning in the action condition led to subsequent sig-
nificant activations, whereas learning in the vision
condition did not. The activations were primarily in the
intraparietal sulcus (IPS) and in the cerebellum in both
hemispheres (see Figure 6). Activations significant
at a cluster size threshold of p < .05 (correspond-
ing to 5 voxels, uncorrected threshold p < .005) are
also listed in Table 3. The analysis revealed no
areas that were more active for vision compared to
that for action. Overall, this analysis supports the
notion that having previous motor experience of the
actions is crucial for the engagement of visuomotor
brain areas during passive viewing of third-person
actions, and furthermore that motor experience alone
is sufficient for the engagement of some of these
areas.
DISCUSSION
The aim of this study was to test whether the brain’s
response to viewing actions is modulated by the
conditions under which the actions were previously
learned. Learning with both vision and action cues,
relative to either cue alone, resulted in significant
activation of the frontal and parietal regions mainly
in the left hemisphere that have been repeatedly
implicated in action production and perception. This
finding supports the idea that correlated motor and
visual activities during action learning lead to the
creation of stronger representations in these fronto-
parietal regions. In addition to that result, we also
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TABLE 2
Summary of t-test whole-brain analysis for vision + action > action (+1,–1,0,0), and vision +




(mm3) X Y Z Max (t)
Vision + action vs. action
L superior frontal gyrus 698 –6 38 46 6.12
L insula 195 –36 –10 19 5.39
L superior frontal sulcus 186 –18 26 37 6.67
L middle frontal gyrus 172 –33 11 52 5.17
L middle frontal gyrus 160 –24 62 13 4.29
L precentral sulcus 146 –42 8 46 5.01
R cingulate gyrus 260 9 –4 37 5.09
R lateral sulcus 146 27 –25 7 4.83
Vision + action vs. vision
R postcentral sulcus 1399 51 –16 31 5.82
R medial occipitotemporal gyrus 205 39 –25 –8 5.84
R cerebellum 199 33 –40 –23 5.06
R cerebellum 142 33 –52 –23 4.73
L postcentral sulcus 4542 –42 –28 43 7.93
L precentral sulcus 530 –21 –10 52 5.36
L superior frontal gyrus 497 –9 –44 43 6.77
L superior temporal sulcus 484 –33 –61 22 6.52
L thalamus 447 –12 –13 –5 7.25
L superior temporal sulcus 433 –45 –37 1 4.65
L cingulate gyrus 376 –15 –1 31 6.42
L inferior frontal gyrus 356 –36 14 22 5.79
L inferior temporal sulcus 286 –51 –70 1 5.68
L lateral sulcus 142 –36 10 16 5.23
Figure 6. Activations from the whole-brain random-effects group-average analysis of action > vision overlaid on the average anatomical scan
from all participants. Activations significant at a cluster size threshold of p < .05 (corresponding to 5 voxels) are shown. Sagittal slices of both
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TABLE 3




(mm3) X Y Z Max (t)
Action > vision
L cerebellum 817 –33 –49 –20 5.95
L intraparietal sulcus 359 –42 –52 46 4.71
L thalamus 315 –9 –19 –8 7.86
L cuneus 293 –3 –72 40 5.74
L intraparietal sulcus 234 –30 –30 31 4.81
R intraparietal sulcus 1412 21 –49 49 6.05
R cerebellum 518 33 –46 –23 4.55
R supramarginal gyrus 248 48 –28 31 4.78
R intraparietal sulcus 217 39 –49 49 5.24
regions by action sequences for which the participant
had only prior motor experience compared to action
sequences learned visually.
The activations we found included IFG and/or IPS.
(Note that the contrasts we performed are not entirely
orthogonal with respect to each other, and so it is not
meaningful to directly compare the resulting activation
maps, e.g., in order to identify overlapping regions.)
These regions correspond to the core regions of the so-
called human mirror system (Rizzolatti & Craighero,
2004), which are commonly activated during action
observation as well as action execution (Buccino,
Vogt, et al., 2004; Chong, Cunnington, Williams,
Kanwisher, & Mattingley, 2008; Dinstein et al., 2007,
2008; Gazzola & Keysers, 2009; Grezes & Decety,
2001; Hamilton & Grafton, 2006, 2008; Hétu, Mercier,
Eugène, Michon, & Jackson, 2011; Kilner et al.,
2009; Lingnau et al., 2009). The regions responding to
action observation seen in fMRI studies also typically
include the superior temporal sulcus (Buccino et al.,
2001; Cross et al., 2006; Cross, Kraemer, et al., 2009;
Grezes & Decety, 2001) and the cerebellum (Buccino,
Vogt, et al., 2004; Calvo-Merino et al., 2006; Cross,
Kraemer, et al., 2009), which we also identified in this
study.
The present findings advance the fMRI literature
on the influence of motor repertoire on visual action
processing. Previous studies have found stronger
activations of fronto-parietal areas when observing
actions that are in the observers’ repertoire, for exam-
ple, observing conspecifics versus nonconspecifics
(Buccino, Lui, et al., 2004), or male versus female bal-
let dancers (Calvo-Merino et al., 2006). Furthermore,
Cross and colleagues have shown that these exper-
tise effects can be built de novo and that the activity
evoked by actions is modulated not only by motor
experience but also by subjective ratings of ability
to perform an action (Cross et al., 2006). In a fur-
ther study, Cross and colleagues addressed the ques-
tion of whether “mirror” activation was modulated by
how observed actions were previously learned (Cross,
Kraemer, et al., 2009). They compared physical to
observational learning (the to-be-learned actions were
dance sequences that participants either watched and
performed, or just watched). Although both types of
learning led to similar brain activations in premotor
and inferior parietal regions, directly comparing the
observation of danced sequences to watched sequences
resulted in two additional premotor activations. To our
knowledge, this study is the first fMRI study to com-
pare all three types of learning (vision + action, vision,
action), and our results lend further support to the pro-
posal that physical learning results in relatively greater
involvement of visuomotor brain areas than visual
learning.
It should be noted that the individual hand postures
of the action sequences used here may well have been
experienced previously, and it is likely that even the
novel condition activated visuomotor systems to some
extent. However, we would argue that actions are made
of sequences of discrete motor states, such as when
a hand moves through space to grasp and manipu-
late a tool. Similarly, in previous studies using novel
dance sequences, for example, Cross et al. (2006) and
Cross, Kraemer, et al. (2009), it is likely that the
various individual body postures had been previously
experienced. However, it is the sequence of actions
that is the goal achieved during dance, and it is this
sequence that is novel. Similarly, therefore, our unit
of assessment was the sequence of action states, and
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An important novel aspect of this study was that we
tested for transfer from first-person learning to third-
person observation. In the training session, the visual
input (where present) was seen from a first-person
perspective, whereas subsequent action observation
was seen from a third-person perspective, as when
observing someone else’s behavior. Therefore, an indi-
vidual’s visuomotor experience transfers, in a way that
depends on the learning conditions, to the observation
of another person’s actions. This finding of transfer is
remarkable as all viewed action sequences were visu-
ally novel, because none of them had previously been
seen from a third-person view. Further, the participants
passively viewed the actions while in the scanner, and
so there was no explicit requirement for motor engage-
ment during the test phase. Interestingly, our results
show increased activation in frontal visuomotor areas
during third-person action observation only when the
actions had previously been learned in the vision +
action condition (compared to all other conditions),
not when comparing action-only to vision-only learn-
ing. Caggiano et al. (2011) have recently shown that
there are view-dependent as well as view-independent
mirror neurons in the macaque premotor cortex. The
authors argued that view-dependent neurons represent
an intermediate step in the formation of view indepen-
dence. Also, a recent human fMRI study (Hétu et al.,
2011) suggests that the activity in frontal and parietal
visuomotor areas is equally strong for first- and third-
person visual perspectives of hands executing several
different types of actions (transitive, nontransitive,
and meaningless hand movements). However, using
multivoxel pattern analysis, Oosterhof, Tipper, and
Downing (2012) found action-specific cross-modal
visual–motor representations in the ventral premotor
cortex only for first-person but not for third-person
views of actions. Evidence for cross-modal encoding
regardless of perspective was found in the parietal
and occipitotemporal cortices. Thus, current evidence
(including this study) supports viewpoint invariance
in premotor areas for viewed actions, whereas the
extension of this invariance to common coding with
performed actions remains less clear, in part because
of the diversity of approaches (e.g., univariate, multi-
variate) taken in previous studies.
We interpret our results in line with frameworks
(Heyes, 2001; Keysers & Perrett, 2004) in which cor-
related and contingent visual and motor signals during
learning combine to most effectively engage fronto-
parietal action representations. This is consistent with
the finding of greatest visuomotor responses to actions
learned with both cues. But how can we account for
the similar effects found in a comparison of actions
learned by performance alone and those learned by
vision alone? One possibility is that viewing was a
more passive task, and hence, less attention and shal-
lower levels of encoding were undertaken when view-
ing compared to producing actions. However, there
are two points to consider: First, the task of viewing
actions has some ecological validity in our study. That
is, in most situations we observe other people with-
out specific motor intent, and it is possible that less
attention is engaged with viewing other people than
when producing one’s own new actions. Hence, dif-
ferences in attention may reflect the normal learning
situation for the development of action representa-
tions, rather than being merely artifacts of our design.
Second, there is in fact evidence for the weaker role
of vision even in learning situations where there is
rich visual input and where attention is actively ori-
ented to vision. For example, male ballet dancers pro-
duce greater activation of visuomotor systems when
observing dance movements that they would produce
compared to moves typically made by female dancers
(Calvo-Merino et al., 2006). Note, however, that in
many situations the male dancers would have substan-
tial visual exposure to the female dance movements
and they would have to carefully attend to them as
they time their own actions to those of their female
dance partners. Hence, female dance movements are
highly relevant to male dancers’ own actions, but they
are not internally generated motor states. Rather, it
is the males’ internal generation of their own motor
output that plays the dominant role in action learn-
ing, enabling passive viewing of third-person actions
to activate motor states.
Therefore, instead, our proposal is that in situations
where a motor behavior is produced but its results can-
not be seen, a visual representation of the ongoing
action is spontaneously generated, as proposed by for-
ward predictive models of vision and action. Because
of delays in sensory processing, it is necessary to pre-
dict future states of visual information after motor
responses. Furthermore, learning of new motor tasks,
as in this study, requires a comparison between future
visual states as predicted by motor output and what is
actually perceived. While the action sequences used
in this study were novel, participants will have had
prior experience of a wide range of observations of
the hand postures that made up the action sequences
(as noted above). Specific motor postures will activate
visual representations they were previously associated
with and therefore as the hand moves to its next posture
visual representations of this future state can be acti-
vated. So during motor responses, visual images are
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visual input are used to fine-tune the visuomotor
system in the development of skills1 (e.g., Kawato,
1999).
Similarly, in accounts such as the ideomotor princi-
ple (Greenwald, 1970) or common event coding theory
(Hommel, Musseler, Aschersleben, & Prinz, 2001),
actions are automatically encoded in terms of the per-
ceivable effects they generate (e.g., hand movements in
this study). In sharp contrast, during passive visual per-
ception of actions, no forward model is required. What
is striking about our current results is that we typically
assume the visual images generated when producing
actions will reflect the egocentric first-person per-
spective of produced actions. However, our findings
suggest that the generated images also generalize to
subsequent views of allocentric third-person actions.
Although we do not know the exact mechanisms by
which the brain achieves this, it seems likely that hav-
ing experience of mirror exposure, being imitated, and
making synchronous movements with other people all
contribute to the brain’s ability to generalize across
perspectives.
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